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1. INTRODUCTION 
There are many processes whose constituents contribute to or are 
likely to contribute to, or are intended to contribute to the achieve- 
ment of some goal or purpose. Such processes are usually called 
teleological, and the goal is sometimes called a final cause. Final 
causality is generally contrasted with efficient causality. 
Teleological explanations are very different from explanations given 
in terms of efficient causes, though the logic of the difference has 
never been made clear. It is sometimes said that efficient causes ex- 
plain the future in terms of the past and the present, while final causes 
explain the present in terms of the future. This characterization is 
overly simple. In the case of a system that is deterministic both 
backwards and forwards, an explanation in terms of efficient causes 
can go in either temporal direction. In an intentional, conscious 
goal-directed process, present plans and hopes play the guiding role, 
so facts about the present explain the probable future. 
Some teleological theories are equivalent to theories expressed in 
terms of efficient causes. Consider the motion of light from a point A 
to a mirror, from which it is reflected to point B. The law of least time 
says that the light follows that path which minimizes the transit time. 
Now minimizing (or maximizing) relative to a context often charac- 
terizes goal-directed activity (compare the principle of maximizing 
utility). The law of least time can be viewed teleologically: the light 
travels as i f  it were trying to reach point B as soon as possible. Yet 
this law is equivalent to the conjunction of two laws of efficient 
causality: light travels through a uniform medium in a straight line, 
and light is reflected from a mirror at an angle which is equal to the 
angle of incidence. 
It has been held that all teleological explanations can be reduced to 
efficient causes, and I will argue for this position in the present paper. 
This is an in-principle claim only, like most reduction claims. 
Teleological explanations are very useful, and from a practical point 
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of view they are indispensable. Opposed to reductionism is the thesis 
that teleological processes are directed by final causes which are n o t  
reducible to mechanisms of any kind. 
I will begin with some ancient teleological doctrines: Plato's view 
that the Idea of the Good has a moral force, Aristotle's theory of final 
causes, and the Neo-Platonic Great Chain of Being. These are con- 
trasted with the mechanisms of Pythagorean harmony and Greek 
at0mism. 
I next introduce my own form of mechanism, what I call "logical 
mechanism". This makes heavy use of ideas from computer science 
and genetics. It is important that the basic causality of computers and 
genetics is efficient causality. 
Section 4 describes a two-part computer model of intentional goal- 
seeking. The static part consists of a goal representation and a plan for 
achieving it. The dynamic part is a repeated feedback cycle of sensed 
input, internal information processing, and action output. This model 
shows that intentionality is reducible to logical mechanisms. 
In order to give a better formulation of the two basic theories of 
teleology, a teleological continuum of goal-seeking systems is defined 
in terms of robot models. This continuum runs from simple direct- 
response systems to intentional systems. There are two traditional 
explanations of this teleological continuum: the final cause theory of 
Plato, Aristotle, and Plotinus, and the reductionist theory of the Greek 
atomists and modern evolutionary biologists. 
I think Charles Peirce has made the best case for the final cause 
theory, and his views are expounded in Section 7. In the following 
section I argue for the opposing theory. The reductionist theory of 
teleology explains low-level teleology in terms of a large, but finite, 
set of direct response rules which often lead to survival and genetic 
reproduction. Moreover, the evolution of intentional systems from 
direct response goal-directed systems can be explained by means of 
efficient causes. 
Consciousness has often been held to involve final causes in an 
essential way, and so we need to consider whether it is reducible to 
logical mechanisms. Two aspects of consciousness are distinguished: 
immediate experience (e.g., a sensation of pain) and functional con- 
sciousness (e.g., the experienced functional connection from pain as 
stimulus to the immediate experience of repair action as response). 
This paper deals only with the nature of functional consciousness. 
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A survey of several types of conscious functioning shows that all are 
ways in which the organism controls itself and its actions. Functional 
pain and color experiences involve short-term control, while in- 
tentionality is a computational procedure for long-term control. But a 
mere collection of specific conscious functions does not have the unity 
of consciousness. 
Consciousness is a single unified subsystem of the human person, 
carrying out many specific control functions intentionally and capable 
of being turned on (awake) and off (asleep). It is suggested that the 
ability to sleep evolved as an efficient general control method for 
protecting an animal from predators during the diurnal period (day or 
not) when it was not efficient for the animal to be active. This theory 
of functional consciousness is automaton based, involving com- 
parisons between the human person, having mind and body, and the 
organization of a computer having a central control. Viewed from the 
perspective of computer architecture, human consciousness is a parti- 
cular kind of computer control system, a relatively simple real-time 
control that, when the system is awake, directs short-term activities 
and plans longer-term activities. 
To conclude, I compare ancient and modern theories of teleology. 
The final cause theory of teleology uses conscious intentional goal- 
directedness as a model of final causality. But, being limited to this 
model, it cannot explain how final causes operate on the unconscious 
and non-representational levels. The philosophy of logical mechanism 
shows how to reduce goal-directedness, unconscious as well as con- 
scious, to efficient causality. 
2. A N C I E N T  T E L E O L O G Y  A N D  M E C H A N I S M  
Elsewhere I have presented a robot model of intentionality and an 
architectural theory of functional consciousness (Burks 1984, 1986a). 
In the present paper I will use theSe and other results to argue that 
teleological processes are reducible to logical-mechanical or com- 
putational processes (see also Burks 1988). 
Perhaps a good way to start my presentation is autobiographical. As 
a graduate student and young instructor in philosophy I taught and 
studied several ancient doctrines which I did not understand, and 
which puzzled me off and on for a long time. Now I would like to deal 
with, and resolve, three of these puzzlements. 
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The first was Plato's doctrine that the Form of The Good directly 
influences and in-forms things and events, and that this influence is so 
strong that one who knows the good does the good, so that all evil is 
due to ignorance. The premiere example of this doctrine occurs near 
the end of the Phaedo, where Socrates says that the "true cause" of 
his staying in prison rather than escaping does not have to do with his 
bones and sinews. Rather, Socrates says, the true cause of his staying 
is the reason he does it, namely, that staying in prison to die is the 
right and honorable thing to do under the circumstances. 
My second puzzle was over a related theory, Aristotle's doctrine 
that final causes are needed to explain purposive growth, for example, 
how an acorn is able to grow into an oak under favorable circum- 
stances. I understood why Aristotle believed that efficient causality 
could not explain the acorn's growth - at least no one seemed to have 
a good explanation of this, as opposed to a description of the stages of 
growth. The problem was that I couldn't understand how Aristotle's 
final cause explained growth either. 
Third, I puzzled long and hard over the Neo-Platonic Great Chain 
of Being, as used, for example, by Descartes in his Meditations. This 
doctrine makes two claims: first, that all beings are arranged in a 
hierarchical system, a kind of cosmic caste system; and second, that 
various levels of the hierarchy have different degrees of being or 
existence or reality. God is at the top of this hierarchy, man is in the 
middle, animals are below, and matter is on the ground floor. Now it 
wasn't the concept of hierarchy per se that was bothersome, for this 
concept is in Plato's Republic. Nor was it strange to find higher 
degrees of value assigned to higher levels of the hierarchy - Plato had 
done that in both the Republic and Timaeus. But I did find it puzzling 
when Descartes talked about degrees of reality and assumed that 
degrees of existence are logically correlated with degrees of value and 
also with degrees of knowledge. 
There is a correlated Neo-Platonic principle of causality, that the 
cause must have at least as much reality as its effect. More technically, 
every entity must have a cause, and that cause must possess at least as 
much reality as the entity possesses. Opposed to this is the principle of 
efficient causality, which places cause and effect on the same ontolo- 
gical level and does not involve value considerations. 
The Neo-Platonic causal principle extends derivatively to represen- 
tations, with the consequence that, since finite man has an idea of an 
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infinitely perfect God, that God must exist. Indeed, most standard 
arguments for God's existence flow from the Neo-Platonic hierarchy 
and causal principle, as follows: 
The cosmological or first-cause argument: everything that 
exists must have a cause, and ultimately a self-caused 
cause, which is the one infinite God; 
The ontological argument: since perfection is correlated 
with existence, if God is defined to be infinitely perfect, 
God must exist; 
The argument from design: every entity was designed by a 
designer which has at least as much design-power as the 
entity designed, hence nature must have a designer, namely 
God. 
Even Berkeley's argument for God depends on this causal principle: 
since we cannot put sense impressions in each other's minds there 
must be a being that does, namely, God. 
What, you may be asking, does all this ancient and medieval 
philosophy have to do with contemporary issues of teleology, the topic 
of this paper? Well, the doctrines which puzzled me are all teleological 
in the most general sense, having to do with the role of values, goals, 
and purposes in creation, growth, development, causation, and action. 
There was, of course, an opposite approach to teleology in ancient 
philosophy. In the same dialogue (the Phaedo) where Socrates gives a 
teleological explanation of his behavior, Simmias gives a non-sub- 
stantive theory of mind. This account is based on Pythagoras' dis- 
covery that the harmony of the lyre depends on simple integer ratios 
2 : 1 (octave), 3 : 2 (fifth), 4 : 3 (fourth). (For the Greeks these were 
ratios of the length of strings, while for us these are the fundamental 
frequencies with which the strings vibrate.) Using this knowledge, 
Simmias draws the analogy: the soul is to the body as the harmony of a 
lyre is to the lyre. 
The problem with this theory of mind is that harmony characterizes 
some minds or persons and not others, so how can the concept of 
harmony be used to explain mind? As Plato said in The Republic, a 
harmonious person is one in which mind (or soul), will, and appetites 
all cooperate, with mind playing the controlling role. As you will see 
later, my architectural theory of consciousness stresses the control 
function of mind (Section 9).. 
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The Greek atomists also gave a materialistic and reductionist theory 
of the mind, contradicting the final cause theory. Consider Lucretius' 
formulation in De Rerum Natura. Lucretius says very clearly that the 
mind is a special compound substance, composed of small, round, 
smooth atoms that dart rapidly around the body, carrying information 
from the senses into the body and carrying instructions for action to 
the limbs. 
Thus Lucretius had a very different theory of mind from Plato. For 
Plato the mind was an indestructible mental atom influenced by the 
Realm of Forms above, while for Lucretius mind was a compound of 
material atoms influenced only by other material atoms. But it is very 
noteworthy that both philosophers held that the mind should control 
the rest of the body and that the good life results from such control. 
Lucretius' view of mind seemed plausible to me. Mental activity is 
the functioning of a material substance which is a different kind of 
material substance from the body, and hence functions differently. 
Nerves are to bones and ordinary flesh as Lucretius' smooth atoms are 
to his hooked and rough atoms. But Lucretius had only analogical 
arguments for his view, and while these had matured into strong 
inductive arguments by the time I studied philosophy, no one had a 
very good account of how the mind works, that is, how the central 
nervous system thinks, reasons, solves problems, controls actions, 
directs the body in the pursuit of goals, and performs other control 
functions. 
3. T H E  P H I L O S O P H Y  O F  L O G I C A L  M E C H A N I S M  
Thus in ancient philosophy there are two theories of teleology, which 
are forms of what are appropriately called "the final-cause theory" 
and the "reductionist theory". In the end I will come out on the side of 
the reductionist theory, but, I hope, in a way that explains teleology 
better than traditional reductionism, and in a way that adds to our 
understanding of why the ancients believed in the final-cause theory. 
The argument will rely heavily on two broad areas of knowledge 
which have developed in the last forty years. The first area is that of 
computers and robots, how to program them, how to design them, and 
also the theory of automata, including self-reproducing automata. This 
subject gives a much more effective idea of the logic of mental 
processes, learning, and growth than existed before. Two concepts 
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from this subject are especially relevant, the complexity o[ a computing 
system and hierarchy. The complexity of a computer is measured by 
the length of its shortest description in some standard design language, 
or by the length of an equivalent program, assuming some standard 
program language. The concept of hierarchy is an important concept 
in understanding computer architectures. A computer organized into 
several levels with control flowing ever downward from the top is a 
little analogous to the Neoplatonic view of reality. 
The second area of knowledge consists of the developments in 
modern genetics in the last forty years, both at the level of molecular 
theory and at the level of genetic theory, including the application of 
game theory, and the conception of the genome as a genetic program 
that constructs an organism which is tested in an environment. These 
achievements have produced a much better understanding of the logic 
of evolution than existed forty years ago. 
It is important in a discussion of the foundations of teleology to 
keep in mind the bearing of these two developments on the issue of 
final versus efficient causality. The basic causality of an operating 
computer is efficient causality, and the causality of genetics is efficient 
causality. 
Using computer ideas, one can convert Lucretius' idea of smooth 
atoms rushing around the body into the computer model of sensory 
stimuli becoming digital messages, these messages being transformed 
by a computer program, and the output messages of that program 
causing action responses. With these modern developments in the 
biological and computer sciences Lucretius' mechanistic account of 
mind is now firmly grounded. 
I have expressed this basic theory about mind in a thesis which I call 
the man-machine thesis, or the man-robot thesis, or the man-automa- 
ton thesis: A finite automaton can perform all natural human [unctions. 
To compare a computer with a human, one needs to make its 
input-output equipment more like that of a human. Imagine television 
cameras for eyes, microphones for ears, and sensory devices for odors, 
tastes, temperatures, etc. As motor outputs, the machine has 
mechanical arms whose hands and fingers can manipulate objects, and 
it has wheels and motors for locomotion. My thesis can also be stated 
as: for each person, there is (in principle, at least) a machine, robot, or 
automaton which will perform the same natural functions. 
The man-automaton thesis expresses functionalism at the behavioral 
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level. It says nothing about how the computer works inside. We will 
get to that later, in two stages: first, an account of intentionality or 
goal-directedness, and second, a theory of consciousness. 
I have developed my argument for the man-robot thesis elsewhere 
(Burks 1972; 1977, Section 10.4.1; 1979). It has three parts: (1) 
progress in biology, (2) progress in the design of computers and 
computer languages, and (3) an argument based on the psychological 
notions of threshold of sensation and minimal accuracy of action. 
The man-robot thesis can be extended to cover computer simula- 
tions and models of biological evolution, natural processes generally, 
intentionality, and consciousness. These views are part of a general 
metaphysics and epistemology which I call "the philosophy of logical 
mechanism" (see Salmon 1989). This philosophy is a generalization of 
traditional materialistic and mechanistic doctrines which relies heavily 
on stored-program computers and robotic extensions of them as 
models. In my sense of "logical mechanism", automatic devices, 
computers, robots, natural organisms, genetic programs, learning 
mechanisms, and evolutionary processes are all logical mechanisms. 
4.  A C O M P U T E R  M O D E L  O F  I N T E N T I O N A L I T Y  
One of man's highest activities is that of formulating alternative goals, 
choosing one goal from among them, and then pursuing it systematic- 
ally and intelligently. This activity is appropriately called intentional 
goal-seeking. I will outline here how to construct a robot with this 
capacity (Burks 1984, Section 2). Intentional goal-seeking employs 
several underlying computer capacities: sensing, reasoning (inductive 
as well as deductive), use of a knowledge base, and action. 
The basic structure of intentional goal-seeking has (1) a relatively 
static part, consisting of a goal representation and a plan for attaining 
the goal, and (2) a dynamic part, a repeated feedback cycle of sensed 
input, internal information processing, and action output. 
(1) A goal is some possible future state of the environment, the 
goal-seeking system, or a relation between the two. Often a future 
goal-state is represented in relation to the present state of the system 
and its environment, perhaps as a sequence of intermediate steps or 
means to the end sought. This representation merges with the sequen- 
tial plan or strategy for achieving the desired end. There are alter- 
native routes for reaching a goal, each with sub-goals. Which alter- 
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native is best depends on the circumstances at each step, circum- 
stances which in turn may depend on the actions taken at earlier steps. 
The plan may include a procedure for modifying the goal or terminat- 
ing the intention under certain conditions. The cost of the effort to 
attain a goal can be compared with the probable reward, and the goal 
modified or replaced if the price of continued efforts becomes exces- 
sive. 
(2) The dynamic part of intentional goal-seeking is an iterated cycle 
of data collection, a process of calculation and decision, and action. 
The system receives information about its environment, and possibly 
about itself. It updates its representation of itself in relation to its goal, 
and evaluates that relation, makes predictions, consults the strategy 
(and perhaps modifies it), decides what to do, and does it. This cycle 
repeats until the goal is reached, modified, replaced, or withdrawn. 
The preceding formulation of intentional goal-directedness is in 
terms of a single, fixed goal. This fits most of the automatic systems 
man has constructed so far, such as guided missiles. Operating systems 
and security systems for computers are designed to reconcile the goal 
of many users and hence are perhaps exceptions. But in any case 
natural systems stand out as typically having a complex of goals, some 
conflicting with each other. 
A natural intentional system, such as a human, has a dynamic 
hierarchy of goals. Basic inborn drives occur at the lowest level. 
Acquired habits dominate intermediate levels. Explicit goals, and 
possibly a life-plan, occupy the highest levels. Moreover, the goals of 
this structure are only partly unified, being partly conflictive, and 
change over time. As John Dewey emphasized, people change not 
only their means but their ends as they learn from experience what 
they want and how to get it. This is especially the case with creative 
work. Also, there may be a higher-level goal of modifying and 
harmonizing the goals on the lower levels of the system. 
The psychologist Franz Brentano held that the mental is not 
reducible to the physical, and thought he had found an ability unique 
to the mental. He said that the essence of mental activity is to be 
directed toward objects that may not exist, and that a material system 
cannot have this property. But it is easy to imagine a robot that thinks 
of a house that doesn't exist, and pursues the goal of making that 
house come into existence. A robot is a complex physical system, so a 
physical system can be intentional. It should be emphasized, however, 
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that the modern stored-program computer is a very special physical 
system, which had not been conceived in Brentano's time, so that his 
claim was plausible when he made it. 1 
This ends my analysis of intentional goal-seeking, i.e., how it 
operates in humans and how it can be built or programmed into 
analysis is only partial, and somewhat paradigmatic, with 








First, it is 
section will contrast intentional goal-directedness with a 
elementary kind of goal-seeking mechanism, direct-res- 
before this, I will make some relevant points about in- 
clear from our computer analysis of intentionality that, in 
this case at least, ordinary or efficient causes explain goal-directed- 
hess. The representation of the goal (a desired future state) plays a 
clear causal role in the teleological process. 
Second, consciousness was not involved in our robot description of 
intentionality. This shows that intentionality is a high-level control 
procedure that can operate without being conscious. An adequate 
theory of consciousness must be consistent with this fact. 
Third, consider the three examples of teleology I learned as a young 
philosopher and which puzzled me to no end: the transcendent forces 
of Plato's Idea of the Good, the teleological action of Aristotle's final 
causes, and Descartes' principle that the cause must have as much 
reality and excellence as its effect. All three of these ideas seem to me 
to be derived from an intentional model of goal-directedness. I will 
elaborate on this point with respect to Aristotle's final causes in the 
last section of this paper. 
Fourth, many tasks can be carried out by either intentional systems 
or by non-intentional systems. Men and beavers topple trees, and so 
do rivers and storms. As Darwin was the first to fully appreciate, the 
artificial selection practiced by plant and animal breeders was paral- 
leled by natural selection. 
Fifth, humans have the best developed and most creative intentional 
abilities of any systems in their part of the universe, although it is 
likely that there are more powerful intentional systems elsewhere. 
Humans have evolved over millions of years from physical and chem- 
ical materials that are non-intentional. Let us now look at this process. 
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5. T H E  T E L E O L O G I C A L  C O N T I N U U M  
A system pursuing a goal responds differently to different circum- 
stances, and insofar as the system is operating successfully the respon- 
ses chosen tend to contribute to the achievement of the goal. An 
intentional system can do this by explicit representation and cal- 
culation in the elaborate manner described in the last section. But 
goals can also be pursued in a much simpler manner. A furnace 
thermostat is an example. It turns the furnace on (or off) if the 
temperature is below (or above) a certain level. Thus it operates by 
means of a fairly direct connection between stimulus and response. I 
call a system that functions in this manner a direct-response goal- 
seeking system. 
Simple organisms are direct-response goal-seeking systems. The 
course of biological evolution from cells to homo sapiens has been a 
gradual development of intentional systems from direct-response sys- 
tems. This process yields a natural dimension for classifying goal- 
directed systems: one can ask of each such system where it fits on this 
continuum. I call this the teleological continuum (see Burks 1984, 
Section 3). 
"Teleology" is used here in a broad sense, to refer to the goal- 
seeking nature of the systems involved. It is neutral between the two 
opposing views: (1) teleology is reducible to efficient, material or 
mechanical causes, and (2) teleology is not so reducible. These views 
will be discussed in the next three sections of this paper. 
In the term "teleological continuum" the word "continuous" is 
intended in a loose sense, allowing that evolution may advance by 
catastrophes, large or small. Furthermore, it allows that evolution uses 
quasi-stable or slowly changing natural building blocks, such as the 
four-chambered heart and the gene. Thus "continuous" means that 
evolution proceeds in relatively small steps, that is, that there are not 
large gaps in the evolutionary chain. 
Evolution and growth proceed continuously, beginning with simple, 
isolated elements and proceeding to complex, highly integrated sys- 
tems operating over a hierarchy of levels. This is an inclusive process: 
the mechanisms of earlier stages are preserved in later stages. For 
example, the human knee-jerk response is direct, and the human 
employs various mechanisms developed along the teleological con- 
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tinuum. Thus direct-response goal-seeking is not replaced by in- 
tentionality, but is incorporated in it. With this inclusion in mind, let us 
compare the way a direct-response system processes information and 
controls itself with the way an intentional system performs these 
functions. 
There is nothing in a direct-response system comparable to the 
static part of intentionality, a symbolic representation of the goal and a 
more or less explicit plan or strategy for achieving it. The function of 
the dynamic portion of intentionality (the iterated cycle of input 
stimulus, internal calculation, and output action) is performed in the 
direct-response system by its set of rules about how to respond to 
specific stimuli. Thus the mode of computation in a direct-response 
system is essentially table lookup, the table entries being the simple 
direct-response hypotheticals: If the input stimulus is ! and the inter- 
nal state of the system is S, then act in manner A. As a result of 
executing such a rule the system moves to a new state S', and so a full 
statement of a direct-response rule should be: If input I and internal 
state S, then action A and next internal state S'. 
In contrast, an intentional system employs the more complicated 
(but more effective in suitably complicated contexts) computational 
procedure described in the last section. The system contains a model 
of its present status in relation to its goal and regularly updates that 
model on the basis of the information it receives. Moreover, the data 
structure used by the intentional system to store its possible action 
responses to various environmental situations is better organized and 
richer than that of the direct-response system. The former uses a 
strategy, that is, a well-organized structure (perhaps a tree) with 
weights representing values and probabilities attached to its options. 
These computational differences between direct-response and in- 
tentional goal-directed systems imply a significant difference in their 
relative abilities to adapt or learn. Each dynamic cycle of an in- 
tentional system incorporates additional information into the system, 
and in the case of a succcessful system that information contributes to 
achieving the goal. As described, a direct-response system has no 
learning ability. A natural extension of it is obtained by replacing each 
individual rule with a set of alternate rules and by providing the 
system with a method for evaluating the relative success of the 
different rules of each set. 2 Such an extended direct-response system 
can learn to adjust to its environment, but not as rapidly as an 
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intentional goal-directed system, since the process of changing rules is 
slower than the computational process of intentionality. 
Let  us return now to the concept of a teleological continuum of 
goal-directed systems, a continuum running from simple direct-res- 
ponse systems to sophisticated intentional systems. I introduced the 
concept by reference to biological evolution, but I want to generalize 
the concept of a teleological continuum and make it more abstract and 
logical. Then it can be connected to automata theory, on the one side, 
and to my three puzzling teleological examples, on the other. 
This generalization is made in two steps. First, remove time and the 
idea of change, and think of the teleological continuum as a linear 
ordering of systems, arranged on a dimension of varying mixtures of 
direct-response operation and intentional operation. 
The second step is rooted in the generalization of my man-machine 
or man-robot or man-automaton thesis to cover all organisms: that is, 
for any organism there is a finite automaton equivalent to it. This is a 
generalization that moves from the materials of a system to its logical 
structure - look at a system in terms of its logical switches and 
memory cells (or their analog equivalents) and how these are 
organized at all levels. Thus in the second step one looks at a 
direct-response system, or an intentional system, or any system in 
between, as an automaton, whether it is made of hardware, soft flesh, 
or even of software running in some minimal universal computer. 
6. T W O  E X P L A N A T O R Y  T H E O R I E S  O F  T H E  
T E L E O L O G I C A L  C O N T I N U U M  
Next I apply the concept of a teleological continuum to the three 
examples of teleology that puzzled me so long: Plato's view of how the 
Idea of the Good produces good conduct, Aristotle's doctrine of final 
causes, and the Great Chain of Being. These three examples are 
closely related. Aristotle's final causes are Plato's transcendent Forms 
or Ideas made immanent. Neo-Platonism is a consolidation and blend- 
ing of Platonism and Christianity. 
To obtain a basis of comparison, remove the transcendent part of 
the Great Chain of Being - God, the angels, etc., and consider only 
Nature, the natural part. This part is clearly a teleological continuum, 
running downward from men through animals to acorns and the like. 
Man is at the highest level (in Nature, that is), and in rational man 
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teleology or final causation operates consciously. At a low level, as in 
the acorn, teleology or final causation operates unconsciously and 
non-intensionally. In comparison to the teleological continuum de- 
scribed by modern evolutionary biology, this ancient concept is, of 
course, very fragmentary. Nevertheless, it is an antecedent of the 
modern conception, both structurally and historically. Moreover, all 
three philosophies had theories to explain the teleological continuum, 
and in a broad sense these theories all employed the notion of a final 
cause. 
In contrast, when Lucretius explained evolutionary facts and goal- 
directedness he always did so in terms of efficient causes, not final 
causes. Moreover, when he explained the evolutionary origin of things 
(compounds of atoms) he didn't appeal to final causes, but to the 
absence of efficient causes (his theory of the initial indeterministic 
swerve). 
Thus ancient philosophy had two theories of teleology, one saying 
that final causes are needed to explain goal-directed action, the other 
saying that efficient causes are sufficient. For the most part these 
theories only attempted to explain the goal-directedness of individual 
systems in the teleological continuum. But the Great Chain of Being is 
a theory of the logical succession of the links of the Chain, and 
Lucretius did attempt to explain a few evolutionary events. 
In the spirit of these two traditions I will formulate two explanatory 
theories of the teleological continuum, as it was defined in the preced- 
ing section. 
(I) The final-cause theory of the teleological continuum: goal-direc- 
ted action is always the result of final causes. At the human level final 
causes operate representationally and consciously. Final causes also 
explain the goal-directed actions of plants and animals at lower levels, 
and on those levels they do not operate consciously or represen- 
tationally. Moreover, final causes explain the successive steps of 
biological evolution. 
Teleological processes cannot be fully explained in terms of efficient 
causality, either deterministic or probabilistic. Final causes are not 
reducible to mechanisms of any kind. 
(II) The reductionist theory of the teleological continuum: all goal- 
directed action is explainable by means of laws governing matter. This 
explanation involves two factors or types of laws: (A) efficient causal- 
ity, and (B) forces or mechanisms that produce compounds that are 
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stable, at least statistically, so that they can evolve. The teleological 
continuum has been produced in nature over millions of years by laws 
and mechanisms of evolution which are, in principle, reducible to the 
laws governing inanimate matter. 
All of this is familiar naturalistic doctrine, except for the require- 
ment that the atoms be such that stable compounds of them can 
evolve, including logical switches, memories, and complex organisms. 
Note that Lucretius postulated an atomic mechanism to explain 
stability: some atoms had hooks and other atoms had holes. Mental 
atoms, he said, were smooth and round. Smooth and round atoms 
cannot form stable structures, so in Lucretius' philosophy the stability 
of mental functioning must be explained by the bodily framework of 
mind. The body channels the flow of mental atoms. (Compare a fluid 
computer in which water moves through pipes and switching takes 
place at valves.) 
It should be emphasized that the only important difference between 
these two theories concerns the foundation of causality. The reduc- 
tionist agrees that in practice it is necessary t o  talk in terms of 
teleology and goal-directedness, even for lower biological forms. For 
most teleological phenomena, the underlying explanation in terms of 
efficient causes is much too complex to serve as a substitute for the 
teleological description. This is so even though reductions by means of 
theoretical analyses and computer simulations may greatly increase 
the scientist's understanding of the phenomena and improve his or her 
way of interpreting them. (We will return to this issue in Section 8.) 
7. P E I R C E ' S  A R G U M E N T  F O R  T H E  F I N A L  
C A U S E  T H E O R Y  
Charles Peirce had a good understanding of the teleological con- 
tinuum established by the work of Charles Darwin and others on 
biological evolution. Both Peirce's pragmatism and his inductive logic 
were strongly influenced by the theory of evolution. Indeed, he 
suggested that the operation of evolution is governed by a com- 
plicated theorem of statistics and inductive logic, a generalization of 
the "law of gamblers' ruin". For the time, Peirce had a deep under- 
standing of how evolution worked, and he understood the relation of 
Darwin's theory to geology (Lyell), economics (Smith and Ricardo), 
and ecology (Malthus). 
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In his later period (1890s on) Peirce attempted a grand metaphysical 
and epistemological synthesis. This was to incorporate and generalize 
his earlier epistemology, pragmatism, semiotic, logic (abduction, in- 
duction, deduction), and also ideas from Aristotle and the medieval 
realists. As part of this synthesis Peirce developed a theory of cosmic, 
biological, and intellectual evolution. This was his triple doctrine of 
tychism (chance), synechism (continuity), and agapism (evolutionary 
love). He depicted an evolutionary process infinite in both directions, 
running from an iniitial chaos through a gradual evolutionary process 
toward an ultimate limit of "concrete reasonableness". 
Peirce's proposed synthesis is a final cause theory of the teleological 
continuum, as the quotations which follow will show. His Thirds are 
the final causes directing the evolutionary advance towards limits. 
These Thirds are akin to Aristotle's final causes and to an immanent 
form of Plato's Idea of the Good. For a long time I had difficulty 
understanding many enigmatic statements of Peirce's later period, and 
I think the following final cause interpretation makes sense of them. 
Peirce was the first post-Darwinian thinker to give a final cause 
theory of the teleological continuum. Henri Bergson's theory of the 
elan vital is a competing theory, but Bergson's Creative Evolution was 
only published in 1907. (It was also very different, for the elan vital is 
an intuitive force, more like a Peircean First than a Peircean Third.) 
C. Lloyd Morgan held that new kinds of systems and principles emerge 
in biological evolution. He thought there was no reductive explanation 
of an emergent, but he didn't use final causes to explain them. 
We present Peirce's explanation of how final causes operate in two 
parts. First, we list six points he makes about final causes, illustrating 
each with quotations. Then we show how his doctrines of tychism 
(there is objective chance), synechism (the evolutionary process is 
continuous), and agapism (the evolutionary process is guided by 
objective values) are related to his final cause theory of the teleologi- 
cal continuum. 
First, final causes operate in concert with efficient causes, final 
causes providing the general goals or ends while efficient causes are 
the means of achieving these ends. 
The mere carrying out of predetermined purposes is mechanical. (6.157) 
Final causality cannot be imagined without efficient causality; but no less on that 
account are their modes of action polar contraries. (1.213) 
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There is efficient causation and there is final, or ideal, causation. If either of them is to 
be set down as a metaphor, it is rather the former. Pragmatism is the correct doctrine 
only in so far as it is recognized that material action is the mere husk of ideas. (8.272) 
Second, final causes are general, leaving room for the employment of 
means that depend on the circumstances. 
. . .  we must understand by final causation that mode of bringing facts about according 
to which a general description of result is made to come about, quite irrespective of any 
compulsion for it to come about in this or that particular way; although the means may 
be adapted to the end. The general result may be brought about at one time in one way, 
and at another time in another way. Final causation does not determine in what 
particular way it is to be brought about, but only that the result should have a certain 
general character. (1.211) 
The evolutionary process is, therefore, not a mere evolution of the existing universe, but 
rather a process by which the very Platonic forms themselves have become or are 
becoming developed. (6.194) 
Thus a final cause only specifies and controls the general character of 
the object it produces, while efficient causality determines the details. 
The final cause in an acorn works towards the acorn becoming an oak, 
but the specific environment will determine how it becomes an oak 
and what kind of oak it becomes, if it becomes an oak. 
Third, efficient and final causes operate in opposite temporal direc- 
tions, efficient causes from past to present, final causes from future to 
present. 
In the flow of time in the mind, the past appears to act directly upon the future, its effect 
being called memory, while the future only acts upon the past through the medium of 
Thirds. (1.325) 
To say that the future does not influence the present is untenable doctrine. It is as much 
as to say that there are no final causes, or ends. The organic world is full of refutations 
of that position. Such action constitutes evolution . . . .  (2.86) 
Fourth, final causality is mental in nature. Human intentional goal- 
directedness is clearly mental. Final causes not operating through 
conscious beings are mental in a broader sense. 
But the being governed by a purpose or other final cause is the very essence of the 
psychical phenomenon, in general. (l.269) 
The mind works by final causation, and final causation is logical causation. (1.250) 
The one intelligible theory of the universe is that of objective idealism, that matter is 
effete mind, inveterate habits becoming physical laws. (6.25) 
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. . .  what we call matter is not completely dead, but is merely mind deadened by the 
development of habit• (6.158) 
• . .  tychism must give birth to an evolutionary cosmology, in which all the regularities of 
nature and of mind are regarded as products of growth, and to a Schelling-fashioned 
idealism which holds matter to be mere specialized and partially deadened mind. (6.102) 
F i f th ,  f inal  c auses  a re  n e e d e d  to e x p l a i n  the  o p e r a t i o n  of  hol is t ic ,  
c o h e r e n t  sys tems .  T h e s e  a re  sys t ems  in  w h i c h  the  pa r t s  a re  h igh ly  
i n t e r d e p e n d e n t ,  e a c h  p a r t  d e p e n d i n g  o n  all t he  o thers .  
Efficient causation is that kind of causation whereby the parts compose the whole; final 
causation is that kind of causation whereby the whole calls out its parts• Final causation 
without efficient causation is helpless;.., efficient causation without final causation, 
however, is worse than helpless, by far; it is mere chaos; and chaos is not even so much 
as chaos, without final causation; it is blank nothing• (1.220) 
Sixth,  f inal  c a u s e s  a re  o b j e c t i v e  v a l u e s  o r  ideals ,  g u i d i n g  the  e v o l u -  
t i o n a r y  p roce s s  so t h a t  n a t u r e  b e c o m e s  e v e r  b e t t e r  a n d  k n o w l e d g e  
e v o l v e s  t o w a r d  p e r f e c t i o n ,  t h e  w h o l e  m o v i n g  t o w a r d  " c o n c r e t e  
r e a s o n a b l e n e s s " .  P e i r c e ' s  e x p r e s s i o n s  of this  p o i n t  a re  u n a s h a m e d l y  
r o m a n t i c  a n d  s e n t i m e n t a l .  3 
Truth, crushed to earth, shall rise again . . . .  ideas are not all mere creations of this or 
that mind, but on the contrary have a power of finding or creating their vehicles, and 
having found them, of conferring upon them the ability to transform the face of the 
earth. (1.217) 
No doubt Truth has to have defenders to uphold it. But truth creates its defenders and 
gives them strength. The mode in which the idea of truth influences the world is 
essentially the same as that in which my desire to have the fire poked causes me to get 
up and poke it. (8.272) 
• . .  as for the cosmos, only so far as it yet is mind, and so has life, is it capable of further 
evolution. Love, recognizing germs of loveliness in the hateful, gradually warms it to 
life, and makes it lovely. That is the sort of evolution which every careful student of my 
essay 'The Law of Mind' [6.102-163] must see that synechism calls for. (6.289) 
. . .  evolution[ary].., development go[es] through certain phases, having its inevitable 
ebbs and flows, yet tending on the whole to a foreordained perfection. Bare existence by 
this its destiny betrays an intrinsic affinity for the good. (6•305) 
P e i r c e ' s  f ina l  c a u s e  t h e o r y  of t h e  t e l e o l o g i c a l  c o n t i n u u m  is m o s t  
s y s t e m a t i c a l l y  e x p o u n d e d  in  his 1 8 9 1 - 9 3  ser ies  o n  m e t a p h y s i c s :  4 ' T h e  
A r c h i t e c t u r e  of T h e o r i e s '  ( 6 . 7 - 3 4 ) ,  ' T h e  D o c t r i n e  of  N e c e s s i t y  
E x a m i n e d '  ( 6 . 3 5 - 6 5 ) ,  ' T h e  L a w  of  M i n d '  ( 6 . 1 0 2 - 1 6 3 ) ,  ' M a n ' s  G la s sy  
E s s e n c e '  ( 6 . 2 3 8 - 2 7 1 ) ,  a n d  ' E v o l u t i o n a r y  L o v e '  ( 6 . 2 8 7 - 3 1 7 ) .  T h e r e  
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are three aspects of this theory: tychism, synechism, and agapism. 
Tychism is the doctrine that the basic laws of nature are probabilis- 
tic. In "the beginning" there were no connections at all, then some 
weak probabilistic connections occurred by chance, and over time 
these have strengthened. The properties connected by laws are them- 
selves probabilistic groupings of simpler properties, and they evolve 
along with the laws. Laws that seem deterministic are actually limiting 
cases of probabilistic laws. Thus probabilistic laws (or "habits") are 
the entities which evolve. 5 
Synechism is the doctrine that this evolution is a continuous process. 
Peirce insisted that it was continuous in the strict mathematical sense. 6 
This was so that the probabilistic connections in laws could evolve 
gradually. Peirce saw that to change from one deterministic law to 
another would involve a big jump, and evolution is more gradual than 
that. 
Agapism is the doctrine that the evolutionary process is guided by 
final causes, or Thirds, and that these tend to make developments 
move in the direction of perfection. This is a generalization of Peirce's 
definition of truth as "the opinion which is fated to be ultimately 
agreed to by all who investigate" (5.407). Both Peirce's earlier epis- 
temological optimism and his later cosmic optimism are forms of 
nineteenth century evolutionary optimism. 
This completes our exposition of Peirce's final cause theory of the 
teleological continuum. We will conclude this section with some 
evaluative remarks about it. 
Each of Peirce's six points has an analogue in our account of 
intentionality (Section 4). First, goals and means operate on the same 
level. Second, a goal is general, and different sequences of means can 
be employed to achieve it. Third, a goal is a desired future state, while 
a means is a present step toward it. Fourth, human goal-directedness is 
mental. Moreover, since it occupies a position in the teleological 
continuum, mentality has developed gradually over the course of 
evolution from lower forms of life, which developed gradually from 
non-living things. Fifth, a conscious intentional human being is a 
holistic-coherent system. Sixth, achievement of a goal is generally an 
achievement of some value. 
Thus Peirce's six points about final causes constitute an insightful 
phenomenology of intentional goal-directedness. His final cause 
theory of the teleological continuum can be interpreted as an ap- 
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plication of this phenomenology to all of nature, by means of three 
metaphysical doctrines: the objective probabilism of tychism, the 
mathematical continuity of synechism, and the progress and limit 
claims of agapism. The result is a very interesting theory of the 
teleological continuum, and the first final cause theory to grapple with 
the problem of Darwinian evolution. 
But we have argued in Section 4 that intentionality is reducible to 
logical mechanisms, and the reductionist theory holds that the 
teleological continuum is also reducible. Thus there is still the basic 
question: Is the final cause theory a better explanation of the teleolo- 
gical continuum than the reductionist theory? Do Peirce's six points 
and his doctrines of tychism, synechism, and agapism explain the 
pre-intentional forms of life and the historical development of the 
teleological continuum? Does Peirce show that the teleological con- 
tinuum cannot be reduced? We will make some general comments 
before moving on to the reductionist theory of the teleological con- 
tinuum. 
Peirce's first, second, third, and sixth points and his agapism con- 
stitute a dualistic account of the driving force of goal-directedness. 
What happens is the result of two kinds of forces and controls: 
efficient causes, which operate forwards, and final causes, which 
operate backwards. Final causes are general and provide probabilistic 
tendencies, guiding efficient causes so they move events in the direc- 
tion of an objectively good state of affairs. Contrast this dualistic 
analysis with that of our computer model of intentionality. In this 
model the concept of the goal is not per s ea  driving force. Rather, the 
motivation comes from the desire for the goal and the will to achieve 
it. Might not the driving forces for pre-intentional goal-directedness 
and the evolution of the teleological continuum also reside in efficient 
causes? 
Consider next Peirce's fifth point, that final causes are needed to 
explain the emergence in evolution of holistic-coherent systems. Such 
systems are very complex and non-linear, with interacting dynamic 
feedback paths involving information flow as well as materials and 
energy flows. Organisms, ecologies, gestalt phenomena, coherent and 
well-organized thought systems, biological evolution, and cultural 
evolution are all holistic-coherent systems. The doctrines of final 
causes (Aristotle), entelechy (Hans Driesch), and elan vital (Bergson) 
were all created to explain such systems. 
But many computer-based systems are holistic-coherent, and the 
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fact that human teams can design and operate them shows the limits of 
the argument that final causes are needed to explain the operation of 
holistic-coherent systems. These computer systems are very complex, 
involving millions of instructions and related hardware. The human 
design teams are necessarily large. Because of the complicated inter- 
active character of these systems, the designers cannot proceed "in 
one fell swoop", either "bottom up" or "top down". Rather, they must 
use a cycli c feedback and successive approximation process, some- 
times designing downward from a general plan of the whole, some- 
times constructing from the parts up. Such a design process involves 
something like the mutual support relation described by the coherence 
theory of truth. 7 
Peirce is correct in treating evolution as a gradual process. Our 
concept of the teleological continuum (Section 5) was inspired by 
Peirce's synechism. He is right in holding that the existence of the 
teleological continuum refutes a dualism of mind and body. But that 
does no t  establish the reduction in either direction. If one believes 
with Peirce that matter is a special case of mind ("matter is mind 
hidebound with habit"), then it is reasonable to say that matter is 
mental in a broad, extended sense. On the other hand, if one believes 
that mind is reducible to matter, it is reasonable to say that mind is a 
form of matter. 
Peirce recognized that ordinary mental categories are not suitable 
for dealing with the lower end of the teleological continuum and 
giving an account of the gradual evolution of conscious, intentional 
mental activity from lower forms of life. He developed his broad 
version of semiotics for this purpose. Thinking and reasoning take 
place in signs, and transform the information expressed by these signs. 
Peirce was among the first to recognize that many lower processes are 
semiotic: the transfer of pollen from a flower stamen to an ovule in a 
stigma, the neutral reaction of a frog's leg to an electrical stimulus, 
punched cards controlling the patterns woven by a Jacquard loom, the 
lower-level reasoning of a logic machine. He would have been pleased 
by Karl yon Frisch's "language of the bees" and the use of languages 
in modern computers. He would have appreciated the fact that half 
the time span of biological evolution was needed to develop the living 
cell, the next quarter to devlop colonies of cells, and only the last 
quarter for the human mind. 
I think goal-directedness, both conscious and unconscious, and the 
evolution of the teleological continuum, can be explained in terms of 
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efficient causality by using the results of two fields of study which have 
developed since Peirce's time. The first is modern evolutionary 
genetics, including the notion of a diploid genetic program directing 
the construction of an organism. Biological evolution is gradual 
(though of varying rates), but it is based on discrete genetic entities. In 
contrast, Peirce's strict continuity is based on the blending theory of 
inheritance, which R. A. Fisher proved to be inadequate (Burks 1984, 
p. 42). Chance plays an essential role in genetic evolution, but there 
are rigid connections as well. 
The second subject is the interdisciplinary theory of computers, 
automata, robots, intelligent systems (natural as well as artificial), 
control systems, and complex non-linear systems. This includes in- 
formation and communication theory, switching theory, the theory of 
finite automata, and the study of computer architectures. It also covers 
the theory of self-reproducing and self-repairing automata, as well as 
computing systems that reason, learn, and discover. 
This approach to teleology is in the spirit of the philosophy of 
logical mechanism, and we will pursue it in the next two sections. But 
first we want to emphasize that at the time he gave it, Peirce's 
argument for final causes was plausible. He believed that evolution 
was progressive, and wanted an explanation of this feature of it. 
Mendelian genetics was not known when Peirce developed his final 
cause theory, and the blending theory was a natural hypothesis about 
the nature of inheritance. Assuming this theory to be true, Peirce saw 
correctly that probability (tychism) and continuity (synechism) are not 
enough to account for evolutionary progress, and he introduced 
agapism (final causality) to account for it. 
Nevertheless, Peirce's doctrine of agapism does not really solve the 
problem, for this doctrine gives no explanation of how final causality 
works. "Agapism" is only Peirce's name for final causality in the 
context of tychism and synechism. The intentional case of final 
causality can be explained in terms of logical mechanisms (Section 4). 
But this explanation does not cover the non-intentional case of final 
causality. 
8.  A R G U M E N T  F O R  T H E  R E D U C T I O N I S T  T H E O R Y  
My main argument for the reductionist theory of the teleological 
continuum is really an extension and adaptation of an earlier argument 
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for the man-automaton thesis (Burks 1972, 1986b). This argument 
had to do with the finiteness of the input stimuli and output responses 
of man, and the finiteness of the computing mechanisms inside. By 
the principle of the threshold of sensation I argued that a human is 
capable of responding only to a finite number of stimuli in any finite 
time span. A corresponding argument applies to a person's output 
actions. Finally, there is a minimum to the size and response time of 
human computing elements. Hence  each person is, in a suitable sense, 
equivalent to a finite automaton. 
Since the teleological continuum runs from direct-response systems 
at one end to intentional systems at the other end, and we have 
claimed that each system of the continuum is equivalent to a finite 
automaton - we pause to show the relation of the concept  of a finite 
automaton to the concept  of a direct-response goal-seeking system. 
Recall that a direct-response rule connects a given input stimulus I 
and a given internal state S to an action response A and a next 
internal state S'. Thus it is of the form 
If I and S then A and S'. 
But a finite automaton is equivalent to a finite set of such rules. Hence  
to say that an acorn is equivalent to a finite automaton is to say that it 
is equivalent to a finite set of direct-response rules. 
A direct-response goal-seeking system, such as an acorn, is a system 
executing direct-response rules. It is important  that each such system 
in nature, including an acorn, is capable of executing only a finite 
number of direct-response rules. In other  words, the teleology of an 
acorn consists of this: an acorn is capable of a wide, but finite, variety 
of direct responses. In a suitable environment it will make a temporal 
sequence of responses that will cause it, by efficient causality, to 
become an oak. 
In Aristotle's time there was no explanation of the goal-directedness 
of lower organisms in terms of efficient causality. He postulated that 
this goal-directedness was due to a gpecial kind of causality, final 
causality, irreducible to efficient causality. Although this was a 
reasonable position at the time, we can now see that an organism with 
an appropriate set of fairly simple rules can, in a sufficient variety of 
circumstances, make responses which tend to contribute to short-term 
goals such as food, space, mating, and reproduction,  and thereby 
perform so as to work towards long-term ends such as survival and 
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genetic fitness. Hence the goal-directedness of these systems - and a 
fortiori, of all the systems of the teleological continuum - can be 
accounted for in terms of efficient causality. 
There were further biological phenomena that Aristotle and others 
after him thought required teleological causality: reproduction of 
organisms, and self-repair. But there are no logical difficulties in 
robots' acc.omplishing these functions by means of efficient causality, 
as von Neumann's theory of automata shows (von Neumann 1966; 
Burks 1970; von Neumann 1986), and biologists are well-advanced in 
giving detailed explanations of how organisms perform them. 
Well, you may say, I now understand how a sufficiently complex 
direct-response system can maintain itself in an environment, grow, 
and reproduce. But I don't yet see how such direct-response systems 
could come into existence and evolve up to man as the result of 
efficient causality. 
This is the higher-order, evolutionary question: Is efficient causality 
sufficient to explain how direct-response organic systems can arise out 
of a physical-chemical matrix and evolve into intentional organisms? 
Here again, I think the answer is "yes". For each organism of the 
teleological continuum, from micro-organisms to man, there is a finite 
automaton which can perform all the natural functions of that 
organism. Moreover, there is an automaton-like account of both 
pre-biological evolution and biological evolution: the evolution of 
purely physical entities into direct-response goal-directed organisms, 
and the evolution of the latter through the teleological continuum to 
intentional goal-seeking organisms (Burks 1984, 1986b). 
It follows that, in principle, scientists should be able to simulate all 
these processes on computers. But these processes are very complex. 
The complete functioning of a single organism is computationally 
complex, the functioning of a group of organisms is more complex, 
that of competing groups even more complex, and that of evolution 
tremendously more complex. Hence it is not within our actual powers 
to simulate evolution in complete detail. My claim for the reduction of 
evolution to computer processes, and related claims such as the 
man-machine thesis, are theoretical rather than practical claims. At 
the practical level one must work with the unreduced theory and 
rough approximations to the underlying theory. 
The idealized gas law illustrates this point. The law is: Pressure x 
volume = constant x temperature. This is a simple and useful law. The 
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underlying detailed theory combines the detailed state of the gas, 
particle by particle, with the laws of mechanics. By a statistical 
argument one can show that the gas law holds for any idealized gas, so 
that in this case the reduction is provable. But this makes no practical 
difference, because the underlying detailed theory is too complex for 
any human to grasp or use. s 
Similarly, a teleological statement is simple enough to understand 
and evaluate, while the underlying detailed theory is too complicated 
to formulate. Thus a teleological description may be used to explain 
why a particular characteristic appeared in a species, and may provide 
a factor for evaluating the survival possibilities of that species, 
whereas a rigid proof of these matters is typically beyond the simula- 
tion powers of existing computers. 
These points may be illustrated with our computer model of in- 
tentionality (Section 4). Suppose one develops an algorithm that will 
make a robot function intentionally. This intentionality algorithm may 
be expressed as a program and put in a general-purpose robot, or one 
can design a special-purpose robot to execute the algorithm. One can 
place the robot in an environment, study how well it works, and 
modify it in various ways to improve it. Each robot is a machine 
operating (by efficient causality) as a system of components (logical 
switches, memory elements, communication wires, etc.), but it would 
not be useful in this context to view it as a detailed system of 
components. The programmer works at some software level, usually 
with a well-developed system which facilitates programming, and 
leaves it to the hardware designer and maintenance personnel to deal 
with the basic hardware components. 
Let us now trace some implications of our broad claim about the 
automaton character of evolution. Consider intentionality. Man, with 
his brain, hands, power of speech, and social organizations, is the most 
complicated and advanced organism of evolution we know of. He 
employs intentional control. Since evolution is selective, the presump- 
tion is that this method of control arose because it is an efficient way 
for an organism to adapt to its environment. 
Our earlier computer analyses of direct-response and intentional 
systems makes this result plausible. Any finite automaton is equivalent 
to a finite number.of direct-response rules, connecting input state and 
internal state to output state and next internal state. These rules 
constitute the state table which defines the step-by-step operation of 
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the machine. Moreover, there is a finite algorithm for converting any 
state table into a computer. That is, given a state table and a sufficient 
number of Connectable computer components, an engineer can in 
principle construct a computer that functions according to that state 
table. In this manner, any automaton, and hence any intentional 
automaton, is in principle reducible to a direct-response automaton. 
An alternative but equivalent method would be to enter the state table 
into a general-purpose computer which could keep track of the 
internal states of the direct-response computer, and for each input 
state look in the state table for the next internal state and the output 
state. 
But as any computer designer knows, this is not a practical way to 
design (or simulate) a computer, and the resulting computer would be 
terribly inefficient. Except for very small finite automata one cannot 
work with state tables and table-lookup because the combinatorial 
explosion from switches and memory cells to possible states is just too 
great. Rather, one must work with the logical structure of the com- 
ponents and the uniformities of blocks of these that enable one to 
move up and down the architectual levels of a design. 
For an example, consider a finite automaton equivalent to Socrates, 
a highly intentional human. It follows from the claims made earlier 
that there is a direct-response automaton equivalent to him, but it 
would be terribly large and inefficient. That is why man evolved as an 
intentional, conscious, free being. 
Similar efficiency considerations explain why teleological explana- 
tions are needed in practice even for reducible phenomena. The 
intentional account of Section 4 describes how a robot could operate 
in a goal-directed manner. A reductionist account would show how 
the robot goes through successive states related by cause and effect. 
But the simplicity, the generality, and the focus on essentials of the 
intentional account are not preserved by the reduction. 
This completes the main part of our case for the reductionist theory 
of the teleological continuum, general considerations about automata 
theory and computer simulation, resting on the impressive results of 
biological science and modern genetics. But there are further issues 
that need to be addressed. These involve the human capabilities of 
intentionality, free choice, and consciousness. These have often been 
held to involve final causes in an essential way, and if they in fact do, 
the reductionist theory of the teleological continuum is wrong. I have 
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already dealt with the intentionality issue (Section 4). I will make a few 
comments about the free choice problem here, and then argue in the 
next section for the reduction of an important aspect of consciousness. 
There are two traditional views about the free will issue, and they 
are correlated closely to the two theories of the teleological con- 
tinuum. The free will thesis is that a free choice is partly uncaused, and 
that the absence of complete causality is essential to freedom and 
responsibility. This thesis is closely connected to the final cause theory 
of the teleological continuum. Compatibilism is the view that free 
choices only require inner conscious control, and that such control is 
compatible with determinism. This doctrine is closely associated with 
the reductionist theory of the teleological continuum. 
Both theories are compatible with an indeterministic 
phenomenology of free choice. The act of choosing among alter- 
natives is a spontaneous event. It is influenced by reasons and other 
conscious factors, but it is not determined by the totality of the free 
person's conscious contents. Relative to this totality the subject could 
have chosen otherwise. 
The free person picks his or her goals and his or her means. Thus at 
the phenomenological and conscious level, "final causes" and 
"efficient causes" are on a par, .as Peirce held. But the conscious free 
choice process is part of a larger context, a system consisting of the 
whole person, the relevant environment, and society. The issue be- 
tween the believer in free will and the compatibilist concerns this 
whole system. 9 The free wilier says that it cannot be deterministic, the 
compatibilist says that it can. Similarly, some believers in free will 
think that the human capacity for free choice depends on final 
causality, while compatibilists assume that efficient causes are 
sufficient to account for free choice. 
I think the compatibilist's position is correct, so that logical 
mechanisms are capable of free choice, but there is not space to 
present my arguments here. 
9. A N  A R C H I T E C T U R A L  T H E O R Y  O F  F U N C T I O N A L  
C O N S C I O U S N E S S  
In Section 4 I showed that consciousness goes beyond intentionality. 
Next we need to distinguish two aspects of consciousness: functional 
consciousness and immediate experience. 
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Consider an instance of pain. Suppose one's toe is injured. This is 
on the physiological side. On the experiential side, one feels a sharp 
pain in the toe, sees that the toe is bleeding, and puts a bandage on it. 
It seems to me that this experience of pain has two aspects: the felt 
pain as such, an immediate feeling of pain; and the experienced 
functional connection from pain as stimulus to the immediate 
experience of repair action as response. 
Another example is taken from Karel Capek's 1921 play R.U.R. 
('Rossum's Universal Robots'). The heroine Helena Glory is upset by 
the fact that the robots have no self-interest. A robot does only what 
it is told. It has no desire to accomplish anything, not even to continue 
operating. Thus a robot doesn't care when it is told that it is to be 
dissected and then put in the stamping mill so its materials can be 
reused. Horrified by this, Helena persuades the chief psychologist Dr. 
Gall to change a "physiological correlate" so the robots will have 
goals and can look after their own welfare. The ultimate consequence 
is that the robots revolt. Goal-seeking and the will to live are func- 
tional. Whether the modified robots have the immediate feelings which 
accompany the exercise of these functions in humans is a question that 
Capek does not address. 
The revolt of the robots illustrates the fact that there are at least two 
fundamental aspects to a living organism, reason and will. These two 
aspects or factors are reflected in the tire of Arthur Schopenhauer's 
book The World on Will and Idea. I think that the will is ultimately 
rooted in the replicating or copying feature of evolution. 
I will now sketch a theory of functional consciousness in two stages. 
The nature of immediate experience and its relation to functional 
consciousness are equally important problems, but there is not time to 
address them here. 
The functional aspect of conscious pain may be illustrated by the 
experience of lepers. Leprosy damages the nerves which carry signals 
from the periphery to the central nervous system. A leper may injure 
his toe, and because he feels no pain is not aware of it. Consequently, 
he does nothing to repair and protect it, and it ultimately deteriorates 
and falls off. 
It has been known for a long time, both practically and theoretic- 
ally, how to make computers that detect and correct their own errors 
and malfunctions. A robot could have circuits which detect the state 
of its appendages and send reports to the central processor, some 
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central control unit responsible for reliability, or to various regional 
units with this function. The responsible unit would decide on a 
method of correction and supervise its implementation: switching in 
an alternative circuit, transferring the job to another appendage, or 
even manually replacing the damaged part. 
The functional aspect of sense experience lies in the organism's 
ability to use the information thus gathered from the environment and 
to respond appropriately to it. To be successful this ability must relate 
sense reports to one another and to thoughts and possible actions in 
various ways, and the sense reports must be of the proper generality to 
make these interrelations useful. This is the problem of pattern 
recognition - which I think will be solved - someday. 
The will-to-live was lacking in Rossum's universal robots as they 
were originally manufactured, but was present after Dr. Gall changed 
a "physiological correlate". What did he do? Presumably he gave the 
robots desires by designing them so they would pursue various goals, 
including self-preservation. To deal with the problem of conflicting 
goals, Dr. Gall might have assigned weights or relative priorities to 
the different goals and organized the robot so that the amount of 
effort it devoted to a goal was influenced by the weight assigned to 
that goal. 
The foregoing shows in a general way how to construct a robot that 
would perform the internal functions associated with pain, color 
experiences, and desires. This general design procedure could be 
applied to other types of conscious experience as well. On that basis I 
advance the following general claim: There could be a robot that 
performs the functional aspect of every specific type of conscious 
human experience. 
It does not follow, of course, that this universal robot would be 
conscious. Our robotic depictions of pain, color experiences, and 
desires, as well as our earlier account of robot intentionality, contained 
nothing of consciousness in them. The universal robot would only 
have more of the same, and hence would be no nearer to being 
conscious. Moreover, a collection of specific functions would not have 
the unity of consciousness. Clearly, something essential has been left 
out. There must be some feature of consciousness or some particular 
way in which a human carries out its conscious functions that has so 
far been omitted from our robot account. We need to investigate what 
it is. 
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To fully comprehend a concept one might understand its relations 
to associated concepts and to incompatible concepts as well. The 
words "conscious", "aware", "awake", and "consciousness' are 
closely associated, while all are to be contrasted with "asleep", "un- 
conscious", "comatose", and "the unconscious". A person may be 
awake (conscious), asleep, unconscious, or comatose. Consciousness is 
functioning in the first case but not in the case of sleep, or being 
unconscious, which differ in the difficulty with which consciousness 
may be restored. 
We are now closer to understanding why a robot which can perform 
all the specific functions of human conscious experience and is, for 
good measure, intentional as well, might not be conscious. It might 
not have a single conscious subsystem carrying out all of these 
functions, a system which can be turned on (awake) and off (asleep). 
Our descriptions of the robot did not contain a description of such a 
subsystem, and did not even employ the distinction between waking 
and sleeping. 
We need therefore to analyze the higher order functional role 
played by consciousness. Why do humans perform certain functions 
consciously, and hence only when they are awake? Is this the best way 
for robots to perform these functions? More generally, why are 
animals conscious - why are they sometimes awake and sometimes 
asleep, and should robots be designed similarly? 
Before answering these questions we need to establish a basic fact 
about the "size" or complexity of consciousness. Consciousness is only 
a small "part" of the person, in the following sense. Consider the 
whole person, body and mind, as a system, and compare its complexity 
with that of the subsystem of consciousness. Consciousness is essen- 
tially vague, so that one cannot give a precise description of a present 
state of consciousness or the conscious rules governing its transitions. 
But it seems intuitively clear that an approximate description of these 
would be very much shorter than a correspondingly approximate 
description of the whole person. This intuition is confirmed by psy- 
chological measurements of the capacity of short-term memory, that 
is, the amount of information that is in consciousness at one time. 
Short-term memory can hold about ten items, while long-term 
memory can store many thousands. Assuming a parallelism between 
mental and bodily activity, the neural subsystem involved in con- 
sciousness is small compared to the whole body. 
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I am now ready to state my architectural theory of functional 
consciousness. A survey of the examples of functional consciousness 
analyzed earlier shows that they have a common property. All are 
ways in which the organism controls itself and what it does. Functional 
pain and color experiences involve short-term control, while in- 
tentionality is a computational procedure for long-term control. This 
observation, combined with earlier comments, suggests our theory of 
human consciousness: functional consciousness is a real-time system 
of relatively small capacity that exerts short-term control of the person 
and is capable of long-term, intentional control. In goal-directed 
behavior the details of a long-term plan are stored in main memory 
and accessed, used, and revised in short-term conscious memory. 
Consciousness developed in earlier animals. We saw when analyzing 
the teleological continuum that evolution is gradual. Hence there is no 
sharp line dividing the preconscious from the conscious. Let us focus 
on the early mammals. Our theory explains the value of consciousness 
to them. Consciousness is a simple system for real-time control of their 
immediate interactions with the environment. But why should it be 
turned on for only part of the day-night cycle and turned off for the 
rest? Why does the state of being awake alternate with sleep? 
A common answer to this question is that animals sleep so they can 
rest and repair themselves. But one can design robots that need no 
rest and can repair themselves without having a periodic sleep mode, 
and can even repair themselves while they continue to work. Hence 
we must look elsewhere for the answer to the question of why animals 
sleep. 
Given the large differences between day and night, organs adapted 
to one would generally be different from organs adapted to the other. 
For example, an eye good mainly in daylight would be different from 
an eye good mainly at night, and one good in both environments 
would be more complex than either. Hence at some stage evolution 
would produce organisms that performed differently during the day 
and the night, in particular, that were active during one of these 
periods and inactive during the other. 
The explanation of sleep I like best is that it reduces a mammal's 
vulnerability to predators during the inactive period. During this 
period the mammal would naturally hide to reduce its danger, perhaps 
in a hole, and predators would be searching for it. When a predator 
came near, the mammal's best strategy might be to remain immobile 
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and not respond at all. Sleep accomplishes this. As Carl Sagan 
expresses it: "Animals who are too stupid to be quiet on their own 
initiative are, during periods of high risk, immobilized by the implac- 
able arm of sleep" (Sagan 1977, p. 131; Webb 1975; Meddis 1975). 
The annual hibernation of a bear or woodchuck serves the same 
function. 
This explanation may not apply to all cases of sleep, and even as it 
stands it is incomplete. On it, the behavior mode to be achieved 
during the inactive period is that of being immobile, not responding 
externally, or "playing dead". The method of turning consciousness 
off during the inactive period and on again for the active period is one 
way of accomplishing this. Note that on this method the on-off 
switching between the active and the inactive mode of performance is 
shared by consciousness and the rest of the system. Consciousness can 
make decisions that lead to sleep, but it is not able to switch the 
organism directly into the sleep mode, and when the organism is very 
tired consciousness cannot prevent sleep. 
An alternative method of achieving the inactive behavior mode is to 
turn the output off while leaving the input on. Consciousness would 
then have two modes of operation: the ability to make quick external 
reactions during the active period together with the ability to abstain 
from external reactions during the inactive period. Presumably evolu- 
tion chose the former method because it was easier to develop. During 
the evolution from animals to primates and thence to man, con- 
sciousness added the function of intentionality, or rational control. 
We have said that an intelligent robot could be conscious. But 
would that be an efficient design, and if so, should the robot's 
consciousness be made very much like human consciousness or quite 
different? These are organizational design questions, the answers to 
which depend very much on the nature of the technology used and 
design process. And these are very different in the cases of the robot 
and the human. 
Human consciousness was constructed by a gradual evolutionary 
design process, beginning with primitive forms of consciousness, and if 
it could be redesigned ab initio there might very well be a much better 
design. Equally important, the sizes and speeds of hardware com- 
ponents are very different from those of biological components. Since 
human consciousness is a real-time control system of small capacity, 
these hardware-fleshware differences are relevant to how much in- 
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formation a robot consciousness should process (how large its short- 
term or cache memory should be) and how a robot consciousness 
should relate to the rest of the robot. Perhaps a good robot design 
would make its short-term memory very large and would devote much 
more computation to long-range planning than a human does. Note 
that these issues belong to the general subject of computer control, 
computer organization, and system management. 
I have now sketched my theory of the functional aspect of human 
consciousness: its nature, its origin, and its function. The theory is 
computer based, consciousness being approached in terms of the 
organization of the human mind and body. Viewed from the perspec- 
tive of computer architecture, human consciousness is a particular 
kind of computer control system, a relatively simple real-time control 
which, when the system is awake, directs short-term activities and 
plans longer-term activities. 
Let us now apply this theory of consciousness to robots. We ar- 
gued earlier that a robot ~could be built to perform the functional 
aspect of every specific type of conscious human activity, including 
intentionality, and raised the question of whether a robot might not be 
constructed so as to have a single conscious system that carries out all 
human conscious functions. The preceding analysis makes this plaus- 
ible. I believe that someday it will be practical to build a robot capable 
of performing all natural human functions and to organize the control 
system of that robot in such a manner that the robot will be conscious. 
Thus the answer to the question "Can a robot be functionally con- 
scious?" is yes. 
1 0 .  A N C I E N T  A N D  M O D E R N  E X P L A N A T I O N S  
O F  T E L E O L O G Y  
The reductionist theory of the teleological continuum is a central 
thesis of the philosophy of logical mechanism (cf. Section 3). Our 
argument for this thesis (Sections 4, 8, 9) is incomplete on two points: 
the compatibilist account of free choice, and the reducibility of 
immediate experiences. Many others have argued for these later two 
claims, and we have done so elsewhere. 1° For the purpose of com- 
parative history, let us assume that these two gaps have been filled, 
and return to the three ancient puzzles with which this paper begins. 
Expressed on questions, these were: How can Plato's idea of the 
366 A R T H U R  W .  B U R K S  
Good operate on Socrates' reason to control Socrates' behavior? How 
do  Aristotle's final causes actually control and direct the acorn's 
growth? What sense is there to Plotinus' Great Chain of Being, with 
its hierarchy of descending levels, each level having associated 
degrees of reality, value, and knowledge? 
As a graduate student I came to philosophy with a background of 
mathematics and physics and some knowledge and interest in Chris- 
tian religion. When I studied and taught these doctrines of Plato, 
Aristotle, and Plotinus I had difficulty in understanding them. I 
couldn't see how to develop or explain them or grasp the models used 
by those who did seem to understand them. 
In this paper I have developed a computer model of human in- 
tentionality and, on this basis, suggested that human intentionality 
was the model for the force of Plato's Idea of the Good, for the 
directivity of Aristotle's and Peirce's final causes, and the model for 
the creative emanations of the Great Chain of Being. Plato and 
Aristotle, the originators of the concept of final causality, derived their 
understanding of teleology by using the Greek craftsman as a model. 
Consider Aristotle's doctrine of final causality: final causes are 
needed to explain all purposive or goal-directed activity of the 
teleological continuum, final causes are as basic as efficient causes, 
and hence final causes are not reducible to efficient causes. 
In the computer model of intentionality (Section 4) one can discern 
a final cause and distinguish it from the stream of efficient causes and 
effects. The final cause is the regulative goal plan. The stream of 
efficient causality is the sequence of sensory inputs, steps of internal 
information processing, decisions, and actions that are taken in the 
process of working towards the goal. I suggest that Aristotle was 
aware of this high level distinction of final versus efficient causality, 
and that to explain the growth of non-intentional systems like acorns 
he moved the distinction back down the teleological continuum to its 
early stages. Peirce followed Aristotle in this. 
There is, however, a fatal weakness in any such attempt to explain 
how final causality works at the pre-intentional level. As one moves 
back down the teleological continuum, intentionality gradually 
weakens and finally disappears, and so does the regulative goal plan. 
Hence the intentional basis for final causality gradually disappears. In 
a direct-response teleological system final causality consists only of a 
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set of direct responses which tend to fulfill the goal, and there is no 
supervisory or directing plan. 
It is nevertheless true at the practical level of macroanalysis that 
final causes are as basic as efficient causes. Final causes are essential at 
this level because a reductionist description of a final cause would be 
much too complex to work with. Aristotle and Peirce were correct to 
this extent. But it is a mistake of level to think that because final 
causes are on a par with efficient causes at the macro-level they are 
also on a par at the micro-level. 
Finally, consider Plotinus' Great Chain of Being. When the tran- 
scendent part of the Great Chain of Being is removed the result is a 
teleological continuum, running downward from men through animals 
on down to simple cells, that is, running opposite in direction to the 
evolutionary teleological continuum (Section 5). According to Plo- 
tinus' doctrine, there is a gradual variation of degrees of reality, value, 
and knowledge (all in close association) along the continuum. What 
sense can be made of this doctrine in terms of our reduction of the 
teleological continuum to an evolutionary continuum of automata? 
Each automaton is finite, and it has a measurable complexity. This 
complexity can be measured in various ways, but by any intuitively 
plausible definition of automaton complexity the evolutionary con- 
tinuum involves gradually increasing complexity. The human is the 
most complex automaton of the continuum. He clearly has the 
greatest ability to acquire knowledge. Most of us believe that man's 
values are more important than the values of lower organisms. Thus 
the teleological continuum is a continuum of gradually increasing 
complexity, value, and knowledge, all in close association. 
Now if we replace the term "complexity" by the term "reality", we 
obtain this result: the teleological continuum is a continuum of 
gradually increasing reality, value, and knowledge, just as the Great 
Chain of Being says. 
The account I have given you of teleology is logical, mechanical, 
and reductive, in the general spirit of my philosophy of logical 
mechanism (Section 3). This account of teleology is very different in 
both language and substance from the idealistic and non-reductive 
teleological philosophies of Plato, Aristotle, and Plotinus. Still, I feel 
that there is enough formal and logical similarity between my account 
and theirs that I finally understand what they were driving at, and the 
ways in which they went wrong. 
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Let me express this conclusion about ancient and modern explana- 
tions of teleology in a different way. Philosophy is a field characterized 
by radical, long-standing disagreement even on the most basic matters 
- perhaps we philosophers are fated to substantial eternal dis- 
agreement. For this reason the following two criteria should be applied 
to each philosophical theory. First, that it give a plausible account of 
the phenomena involved, an account which is somewhat constructive 
and somewhat logical in structure. Second, that the theory explain why 
the opposing theory seemed plausible to those who advocated it. 
The philosophy of logical mechanism shows how modern computer 
and genetic concepts can be used to reduce the goal-directedness of 
each system of the teleological continuum to efficient causality and 
also to reduce the evolutionary development of the teleological con- 
tinuum to efficient causality. Furthermore, this reductive account 
explains why Plato, Aristotle, Plotinus, and Peirce advocated non- 
reductive theories of teleology. Each was, in his own intellectual 
context and in his own way, extending human intentional goal-direc- 
redness to nature as a whole. This was a simple and natural approach, 
and in ancient, medieval, and even modern times it worked about as 
well as the reductionist theory, for in those times neither theory could 
really explain teleological processes. This situation has changed dras- 
tically in the present century with the development of evolutionary 
genetics and theoretical and practical knowledge of computers. 
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i Brentano also believed that intentionality involves consciousness. While my reduction 
of intentionality does not cover consciousness, I offer a reductive account of con- 
sciousness later (Section 9). 
2 As in John Holland's bucket-brigade algorithm. See Holland (1985), Holland et al. 
(1986), and Burks (1988). 
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3 For an interpretation of Peirce's rhetoric, see Burks (1981). 
4 There are many other references, including: 1.22, 1.204, 1.207, 1.231, 1.615, 2.66, 
6.163, 6.320, 6.477, 6.582, 6.604, 8.2, and 8.318. 
5 For further analysis of tychism, see Burks (1977, Section 9.3.4). 
6 Peirce had a rather rich and strange sense of the mathematical continuum, one that 
incorporated a notion of the infinitesimal. He never made clear what this concept was, 
but I do not think the difference between his concept of the mathematical continuum 
and the standard one is relevant to his final cause theory of the teleological continuum. 
7 See Burks (1988). Section l l  argues that there is a holistic kind of causality, inverse 
causality, which contrasts with direct causality, but is reducible to a system of direct 
causality. 
8 See the analysis of embedded subsystems in Burks (1977, Section 9.4.i). 
9 Thus it is an issue concerning the relation of an embedded subsystem to its underlying 
system. See Burks (1977, Section 9.4.1). 
lo Salmon (1989, Sections 3.3 and 3.4 of my replies). 
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